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Abstract
Although some authors claim that deception requires intention, we argue that there can be deception in social robotics, 
whether or not it is intended. By focusing on the deceived rather than the deceiver, we propose that false beliefs can be cre-
ated in the absence of intention. Supporting evidence is found in both human and animal examples. Instead of assuming that 
deception is wrong only when carried out to benefit the deceiver, we propose that deception in social robotics is wrong when 
it leads to harmful impacts on individuals and society. The appearance and behaviour of a robot can lead to an overestimation 
of its functionality or to an illusion of sentience or cognition that can promote misplaced trust and inappropriate uses such 
as care and companionship of the vulnerable. We consider the allocation of responsibility for harmful deception. Finally, 
we make the suggestion that harmful impacts could be prevented by legislation, and by the development of an assessment 
framework for sensitive robot applications.
Keywords Robot · Deception · Intentional deception · Harm · Robotics · False belief · Prevention · Social robotics · Illusion
“Most of the evil in this world 
is done by people with good 
intentions.”― T.S. Eliot.
Introduction
According to a number of authors (e.g. Matthias 2015; Spar-
row and Sparrow 2006; Sparrow 2002; Wallach and Allen 
2009; Sharkey and Sharkey 2011), the development and 
creation of social robots often involves deception. By con-
trast, some have expressed doubts about the prevalence of 
deception in robotics (e.g. Collins 2017; Sorell and Draper 
2017). It seems that there is disagreement in the field about 
what counts as deception, and whether or when it should 
be avoided.
The 4th principle of the U.K. Engineering and Physical 
Sciences Research Council’s (EPSRC) (Boden et al. 2017) 
‘principles of robotics’ states that ‘Robots are manufactured 
artefacts. They should not be designed in a deceptive way to 
exploit vulnerable users; instead their machine nature should 
be made transparent’. Although this principle is a step in the 
right direction, there is a need for a more detailed considera-
tion of what constitutes deception in social robotics, when 
it is wrong, who should be held responsible, and whether it 
can be prevented or avoided.
A social robot is a physically embodied robot that is able 
to socially interact with people. Wallach and Allen (2009) 
hold that any techniques enabling robots to detect basic 
human social gestures and to respond with human-like social 
cues, “are arguably forms of deception” (pp 44). Matthias 
(2015) suggests that a robot that appears to have mental or 
emotional capabilities that it does not really have, is impli-
cated “in a kind of deception” (pp 17). Grodzinsky et al. 
(2015) declare that deception is involved if the behaviour of 
a machine “leads another agent to believe or behave as if the 
machine is human or some other carbon-based life form”. 
Sharkey and Sharkey (2011) see “efforts to develop features 
that promote the illusion of mental life in robots as forms 
of deception”, since current robots have neither minds nor 
experiences (pp 34). Johnson and Verdicchio (2018) con-
sider the possible appearance of suffering in either animals 
or robots and conclude that “both [can] involve the appear-
ance of suffering but when it comes to robots, the appear-
ance is a deception” (pp 299).
Sorell and Draper (2017) are more sceptical about decep-
tion in robotics. They set a high bar and assume deception is 
involved only if the design of a robot misleads people into 
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believing that it is a real human or animal. This bar would 
not often be surmounted, since it is rarely the case that peo-
ple are fooled into believing that a robot is actually a human, 
or an animal (unless it is viewed under quite limited condi-
tions, such as for a very short time period—see Ishiguro 
2006). Collins (2017) also argues that animal-like robots 
are not developed with the intention of convincing the user 
that the robot is alive.
A primary aim of this paper is to make the case that, 
despite some claims to the contrary, there is deception in 
social robotics. The idea that there is deception is some-
times rejected on the basis that the developers and program-
mers of social robots may not have intended to deceive. In 
an effort to counter this resistance, we examine definitions 
of deception, and argue that deception can still occur even 
in the absence of conscious intention. If a person believes 
that a social robot has emotions and cares about them, they 
are being deceived: even if no-one explicitly intended that 
belief. An important first step to preventing the harmful con-
sequences of deception in social robotics is to recognise that 
it can and does occur. Once this is recognised, an important 
next step is to consider what harmful effects it could have. 
We identify potential examples of such effects and follow 
this with a discussion of who could be held responsible, and 
whether such consequences could be prevented.
Deception without intention
Underlying some of the disagreement about whether or not 
deception is involved in social robotics are differences of 
opinion about whether it necessarily involves intention on 
the part of the deceiver. Sorell and Draper (2017) propose 
that it requires “the intentional creation of false beliefs”. 
They argue that other authors (Sharkey and Sharkey 2011) 
set too low a threshold for deception by not requiring the 
creation of an intentionally produced false belief that a robot 
is alive. As an example, they consider the Paro, a fur covered 
seal-like robot used for therapy for older people. They argue 
that no deception is involved in its use, since it can provide 
comfort without the need for an intentionally produced false 
belief that the robot is a real seal.
We disagree and argue that there can be deception with-
out intention. In the case of Paro, the manufacturers did not 
intend to create the false belief that the robot is an actual 
seal. Rather they wanted to create a therapeutic object that 
reminded people of a pet and gave them some relief from 
stress. Nonetheless, the illusion of sentience or cognition 
created for some people by its appearance and behaviour can 
be said to be a deception.
Several other authors define deception as involving 
intention. For instance, Carson (2010) ‘roughly’ defines 
deception as ‘intentionally causing someone to have false 
beliefs’ (‘roughly’ because he has more detailed defini-
tions associated with particular cases). Carson points out 
a difference between lying and deception in that unlike 
lying, ‘deception’ implies success: in order to count as 
deception, an act must actually cause someone to have 
false beliefs. Another definition of deception is provided 
by Zuckerman et al. (1981) and requires that a human be 
deceived: ‘an act that is intended to foster in another per-
son a belief or understanding which the believer considers 
to be false’. Grodzinsky et al. (2015) say that their main 
interest is represented by examples of ‘an intentional, suc-
cessful attempt by developers to deceive users’.
Bok (1999) makes a distinction between deception and 
lying. For her, lying does involve intention, but the same 
is not necessarily the case for deception. In her book on 
‘Lying’, Bok defines lying as ‘any intentionally decep-
tive message which is stated’ (Bok 1999). However, 
she claims that when a person states false information 
that they believe at the time to be true, it should not be 
described as a lie even though it engenders a deception, 
for any deception that occurs as a result was not intended 
by them. Bok identifies various situations in which people 
might convey false information in the belief that it is true. 
These include cases where they have been misinformed, 
where they are mistaken, or tired, or inarticulate or even 
delusional. In situations like these, deception may have 
occurred even though there was no intention to deceive.
We agree with Bok that intention is not a necessary 
condition for a deception to have occurred. This can be 
seen more clearly when perspective is shifted from the 
deceiver to the deceived. For example, Fallis and Lewis 
(2019) refer to deception in the animal kingdom as ‘func-
tional deception’, recognising that it involves evolution 
rather than intention.
Discussing the evolution of deception, Bond and Robin-
son (1988) define it as ‘a false communication that tends to 
benefit the communicator’. Examples include camouflage, 
mimicry, death feigning, and distraction displays:
• Camouflage confers an evolutionary advantage to the 
peppered moth, Biston betularia. It comes in two col-
ours, speckled and black, and in polluted areas the black 
form has come to dominate making the moth less visible 
to predators.
• Mimicry can be found in the viceroy butterfly, which is 
palatable, but which has the markings of a monarch but-
terfly that birds recognise as inedible.
• Death feigning, a deception and anti-predator adaptation, 
occurs in a range of animals: lizards, birds, rodents and 
sharks (Pasteur 1982).
• Distraction displays, that draw attention away from nests 
and young, are found in both birds and fish (Armstrong 
1954).
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We also don’t have to look far to find examples of decep-
tion without intention in the human world: for instance, the 
doll therapy used for people with dementia (Sharkey and 
Sharkey 2010b). Off-the-shelf baby dolls are used to thera-
peutically stimulate memories of a rewarding life role, and 
to act as a focus for reminiscence and conversation (Cayton 
2006). James et al. (2006) point out that even though these 
dolls were designed as children’s toys, many clients come 
to believe that their doll is a real baby. They try to feed it 
and are even prepared to give up their own bed for it to have 
a good night’s sleep (ibid). Likewise, there are men who 
believe that their static sex doll is in love with them and 
that they are in a loving relationship with it (Sharkey et al. 
2017). This was probably not intended by the developers of 
sex dolls.
These examples show that both non-human animals and 
humans can be subject to deception without any intentional 
attempt to deceive. They support our claim that a deception 
can be said to have occurred in robotics if the appearance 
and the way that a robot is programmed to behave, creates, 
for example, the illusion that a robot is sentient, emotional, 
and caring or that it understands you or loves you. These are 
all deceptions because, at present and for the foreseeable 
future, robots are machines that are not alive, sentient or 
capable of feelings. Yet none of these deceptions necessarily 
require a conscious intention on behalf of robot manufactur-
ers or designers who may simply have meant to entertain.
When is deception wrong?
Some deceptions can be harmless fun. For example, show 
robots used in the leisure industry can entertain and motivate 
the next generation of engineers1. There can also be situa-
tions in which people are both entertained and aware that 
the illusion of sentience created by a social robot is not real. 
Coeckelberg (2018) argues that any deception or illusion 
created by information technology is the result of a perfor-
mance ‘co-created and co-performed by humans (magician/
designer and spectator/user) and non-humans (robots and 
other machines, artefacts and devices)’ (Coeckelberg 2018, 
pp 78). As in the case of a magic show, the users/audience 
may not have been fooled into thinking that a robot is sen-
tient, or has emotions, and may know that it is a trick. This 
is likely to be the case when a social robot is displayed to 
an audience with a reasonable knowledge of robotics. The 
audience members could enjoy the performance, at the same 
time as looking for clues or asking questions about how the 
performance was accomplished. This is less likely to be the 
case with naïve audiences, or vulnerable groups of peo-
ple such as the very young, or older people with cognitive 
limitations.
As well as entertainment, some deceptions can be created 
with good intentions that lead to better outcomes for the 
deceived. Bok (1999) gives several examples of deceptions 
created with the good intention of helping or protecting the 
deceived, including placebos, white lies, or the lies that used 
to be told to the sick and dying (a practice now uncommon). 
And in robotics, there is evidence that animated robot pets, 
such as the Paro, can improve the health and well-being of 
vulnerable users (Robinson et al. 2013).
At the other extreme, Sparrow (2002) argues that the self-
deception involved in an imaginary relationship with a robot 
is inherently wrong and violates a duty to see the world as it 
is. Presumably his position would also apply to the treatment 
of people with dementia, even though some deceptions (such 
as offering them a robot seal pet to care for) might alleviate 
their distress and anxiety. He also argues that those who 
design and manufacture robots that encourage such beliefs 
are unethical.
In contrast, as mentioned previously, Sorell and Draper 
(2017) focus on the intentions of the deceiver. So, for them, 
deception in robotics is wrong only when the deceiver wants 
to manipulate the deceived person to do something that 
serves the interests of the deceiver. In other words, when 
the deceiver has malign, or at least self-serving, intentions.
Our argument is that determining whether or not decep-
tion in robotics is wrong should be based on assessments 
of the likely impact on individuals and society regardless 
of the beneficent, or malignant, intentions of a deceiver. 
Efforts to anticipate the possible negative effects and risks 
of robotics applications underlies much of the emerging field 
of robot ethics. It is important to make the attempt to foresee 
risks and concerns before the applications become so deeply 
entrenched in society that they can no longer be prevented 
or even curtailed.
It is possible to identify two kinds of risk that could result 
from the development and presentation of social robots that 
appear to have emotions and to be able to understand and 
care about humans. We consider in turn (i) those that stem 
from the deception involved in robots that appear to have 
emotions and to care for us; and (ii) those that originate in 
over-estimations of the ability of robots to understand human 
behaviour and social situations.
First, we consider the possible negative consequences of 
any emotional deception that encourages us to believe that 
a robot cares for us, has emotions, and is something with 
which we could form a relationship.
For young children and babies, there are clear risks to 
emotional deception. At the extreme, leaving babies in the 
‘care’ of robots for prolonged periods could interfere with 
1 Although this can be problematic under some circumstances when 
it leads to general and harmful overestimation of the technology (see 
Sharkey, 2018).
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the formation of secure attachments to their primary human 
carers (Sharkey and Sharkey 2010a). We can only speculate 
about the risks since it would clearly be unethical to conduct 
experiments on babies with such a risk of harm. We turn 
instead to indirect evidence that demonstrates the creation of 
attachment disorders such as the disturbing reports of chil-
dren in Romanian orphanages deprived of human interac-
tion (Nelson 2007; Chugani et al. 2001). And Harlow’s clas-
sic experiments (Harlow and Zimmerman 1958), in which 
young rhesus monkeys were left in the exclusive company 
of artificial wire or cloth covered ‘mothers’. These provide 
indicative evidence of the devastating effects of the loss of 
attachment and bonding opportunities with a significant liv-
ing being.
Even without the extremes of full-time child care, there is 
still a considerable interest in developing robot companions 
and internet-connected toys for children. One risk of hav-
ing such companions is that children who spend too much 
time interacting with them will miss out on opportunities to 
learn about the natural give and take of human relationships 
with their peers and might even come to prefer the predict-
ability of a robot companion that always agrees with them, 
always listens to them, and always puts up with their selfish 
behaviour.
Turkle (2017) is also concerned about the idea of such 
companions and writes, ‘These machines are seductive 
and offer the wrong payoff: the illusion of companionship 
without the demands of friendship, the illusion of connec-
tion without the reciprocity of a mutual relationship. And 
interacting with these empathy machines may get in the 
way of children’s ability to develop a capacity for empathy 
themselves.’ There is already a growing awareness of the 
addictive effect of technologies such as social networks, or 
mobile phones (Kuss 2017) and it seems that a physically 
embodied and rewarding robot companion would be simi-
larly difficult to resist. As in the case of babies and robot car-
ers, the potential risks raised here are inevitably speculative. 
Because research based on limiting children’s companions 
to robots to the exclusion of human friends is unlikely to 
receive ethical approval, there is little clear evidence of the 
detrimental effect on children as a consequence of long-term 
interactions with robot companions.
Scheutz (2011) suggests another risk to people forming 
emotional uni-directional bonds with trusted social robots. 
A company could exploit such relationships to encourage 
the purchase of their products. And there is indeed evidence 
from Tanaka et al. (2007) that ‘long-term bonding’ occurred 
between toddlers and a social robot operated over 5 months 
in a day-care centre. Children who believe that a robot (or 
internet-connected toy such as ‘Hello Barbie’) is their friend 
might confide in it without any awareness of the ways in 
which their confidences might be shared or used to manipu-
late their purchasing behaviour. This is quite different to the 
bonds that children form with inanimate, unconnected, teddy 
bears and dolls.
There is evidence that adults form attachments to robots 
even when they are remote controlled bomb disposal robots 
(Carpenter 2016) or robot vacuum cleaners (Sung et al. 
2007). When the robots are furry robot pets, or cute looking 
humanoids, attachment formation is even more likely. Such 
emotional attachments could have negative consequences 
for vulnerable adults such as those with dementia or other 
cognitive limitations (Sharkey and Sharkey 2012; Sharkey 
2014). They might choose to neglect their relationships with 
fellow humans to focus their emotions and attentions on the 
robot instead. They could become anxious and concerned 
about their robot companions. In addition, robot companions 
which give rise to the deceptive illusion that they care and 
understand, could result in a reduction of contact with other 
human beings for vulnerable individuals. Friends, family, 
and care providers in general, might come to believe that the 
social and attachment needs of an older person were being 
met by a robot companion or pet, and as a consequence 
might reduce the time they spent with them.
As in the case of children, an older person who believed a 
robot to be their friend might share information with it that 
they would not like to be shared more widely. They might 
also follow its advice, which cannot be guaranteed to always 
be appropriate for their situation.
The second set of risks considered here stem from an 
overestimation of the ability of robots to understand the 
world that results in delegating decisions to them that impact 
on the quality of a human life. If the illusion is created by 
means of their appearance and behaviour that robots are able 
to understand our world, and to make justifiable decisions, a 
risk of such deception is that robots could be inappropriately 
deployed in social roles for which they are unsuited. Sharkey 
(2016) considers the use of robot teachers in classrooms, 
where they could be required to make decisions for which 
they are not equipped. These could be decisions about what 
counts as good or bad behaviour in children. Or decisions 
about a child’s readiness to learn something. Although many 
teachers are clear that robots would not have the ability to 
replace humans in the classroom (Serholt et al. 2017), this 
might not be so clear to educational authorities, particularly 
when there are staff shortages or when budget cuts have to 
be made.
Robots used for the care of children, or fragile old peo-
ple, might also be delegated with decision making that 
goes beyond their functionality. For instance, a robot 
looking after children might be expected to prevent them 
from injuring themselves—but there is a myriad of cir-
cumstances in child care that it would be impossible for 
programmers to anticipate. For example, would a robot be 
able to recognise the difference between a child picking 
up scissors for a craft project, and a child using scissors 
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to dangerously poke into a toaster? Of course, some 
dangerous situations could be anticipated by the robot’s 
developer, but real life in the real world is crowded with 
unanticipated and unpredictable events that could lead to 
negative consequences.
The creation of a robot, or computational artefact, that 
encourages the belief that it is able to make moral decisions 
is particularly concerning. There is a growing awareness 
of the risks associated with algorithmic decision making 
by machines that are trained on big data, but which have 
no understanding of the meaning or effects of their deci-
sions (Sharkey 2018). An extreme example of algorithmic 
decision making can be found in the example of lethal 
autonomous weapons, where concerns are being raised 
about giving robots the power to make life or death deci-
sions about who to kill on the battlefield (see the Campaign 
to stop Killer Robots website for arguments for a ban of 
such weapons). An example that is closer to home is that of 
the autonomous car, and discussions of its decisions about 
where to turn and who to hit in the event of an accident (Lin 
2016). The appearance and behaviour of a social robot that 
creates an illusion of understanding could foster belief in its 
moral competence.
In this section, we have considered two kinds of risks 
stemming from deception in social robots. There is a set 
that stem from imagining that a robot is emotional and able 
to care for humans. If babies and children were to be left in 
the ‘care’ of robots for long periods, there is a danger that 
this could have a serious effect on their social and emotional 
development. Children and vulnerable older people could 
turn away from human companions in the mistaken illusion 
that a robot was something they could have a relationship 
with. There is evidence (Epley 2007) that those who are 
lonely and in need of social contact are more likely to engage 
in anthropomorphism. Both young and old might also con-
fide in the robot they think is their friend, without under-
standing that their confidences might be shared more widely. 
Erstwhile robot ‘companions’ might also be used to encour-
age or pressurise them to make unnecessary purchases.
There are also risks that arise from being deceived into 
overestimating the abilities of robots, and inappropriately 
placing them in positions of responsibility, e.g. in charge of 
classrooms, or of the vulnerable in care homes. People can 
overestimate the strengths and competences of a computa-
tional algorithm, but the development of robots with human-
oid appearances that appear to understand and respond to 
human emotions and needs, has the potential to be that much 
more compelling.
There is a particular need to recognise the risks for the 
more vulnerable members of society, who are often depend-
ent on others to make decisions for them. The youngest and 
oldest members have a greater need for protections to be 
in place to limit their exposure to robots, to ensure their 
access to human companionship and care and to prevent 
their exploitation by social robots.
Who is responsible, and can we prevent 
deception in social robotics?
It may be impossible, even undesirable, to prevent all decep-
tion in robotics. As we have seen, some deceptions can lead 
to health benefits. There are also humanoid, and animal-like, 
robots that are entertaining: anthropomorphic entertainment 
devices date back to antiquity.
However, where there is a risk that deception in social 
robotics could lead to harmful consequences, it would be 
wise to attempt to find ways of preventing or limiting it. It 
would be easier to prevent harmful deceptions if we could 
identify who should be held responsible. The problem is 
that establishing responsibility is difficult because, as argued 
earlier, it can occur in the absence of an ‘intent to deceive’. 
The challenge is made greater by the number of people usu-
ally involved in the development of a robot application. But 
before discussing this further let us first lay to rest the idea 
that a robot itself could be held responsible for deception.
Even an autonomous robot acting without concurrent 
human control can do only what it has been programmed 
or trained to do. Robots are dependent on human interven-
tion for their programming, or for setting up and designing 
the conditions for machine learning. Occasionally roboti-
cists inappropriately describe their robots as being decep-
tive. For example, Arkin et al. (2012) reported a study in 
which he said that robots had deceived an observer about 
which route they had taken. But the deceptive behaviour of 
the robots was explicitly hand coded: the programmer was 
responsible for the deception and not the robots. Even when 
deceptive behaviour seems to emerge spontaneously, as in 
a case reported by Floreano et al. (2007), human interven-
tion is still involved. In that study, robots were shown to 
evolve a capacity to send deceptive signals to other robots. 
However, this ‘evolution’ was dependent on the situation in 
which humans placed them, and the human programming of 
the evolutionary design and objective function.
If robots cannot be held responsible for deception, 
could the users of robots be implicated? It is well known 
that humans are anthropomorphic about robots and other 
machines, or any inanimate objects with certain features. 
It is less clear that humans have much choice in this mat-
ter. An animated and apparently needy robot can be hard to 
resist. As pointed out by Turkle (2011), a robot that seems 
to require care and nurturing is particularly compelling. Vul-
nerable old people and young children may be especially 
susceptible to such anthropomorphic cues (Epley 2007).
Even if humans may sometimes be willing collaborators 
in the illusions created by robots, responsibility can be still 
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be attributed, at least in part, to manufacturers and market-
ers. Those marketing or advertising a robot may exaggerate 
its abilities, as in descriptions of the Cozmo robot as hav-
ing ‘real emotions’. The designers and programmers may 
also exploit features that encourage the illusion of sentience 
and understanding. These include the robot’s appearance, 
the facility to detect human emotions and to indicate an 
emotional response, and the facility for speech recognition 
and speech generation. Excuses and justifications for such 
features and any exaggerated descriptions may be based on 
claims about intended beneficial effects, and a denial of any 
intention to deceive.
Although it can be argued in some cases that there was no 
clear intent to deceive, robot developers, programmers and 
sellers should bear some of the responsibility if they should 
have foreseen a harmful deception. Matthias (2015) argues 
that if a machine says, ‘I love you’, deception is necessar-
ily involved because the machine lacks the corresponding 
mental state. He argues that such deception can be ‘foreseen 
but not intended’. When a robot pet is created to entertain 
a child, the humans involved in its development may have 
intended to amuse and educate rather than to deceive. But 
they should have been able to foresee children’s misinterpre-
tation of the robot’s actions as indicating ‘a genuine, alive 
pet.’ This also applies to humanoid robot companions for 
either children, or older people. Although the developers 
might not intend any deception, it could be argued that they 
should have foreseen that such users would perceive the 
robot as having a meaningful relationship with them.
Unfortunately, even if it is accepted that the program-
mers, developers and marketers of social robots bear some 
responsibility for the deceptions they can engender, it is still 
difficult to see how to prevent harmful effects. Prevention is 
made harder by the human tendency to be fascinated by tech-
nology, and by people’s willing and enthusiastic tendency 
to be anthropomorphic. Nonetheless, we can consider some 
suggestions.
Scheutz (2011) suggested two ways to minimise the 
negative effects of deception, but we do not think that 
either are likely to be effective. One suggestion is to 
legally require a robot to continuously remind the user 
that it is only a machine and has no emotions. But it is 
not clear that this would prevent people from forming an 
attachment to it, and it might interfere with the comfort 
and relief from anxiety that interactions with a robot pet 
may create for some people requiring it for therapeutic 
reasons. The second suggestion is to equip the robot with 
an emotional system or to develop robots with a sense 
of morality. This seems unlikely to happen in the near 
future. There have been attempts to program robots with 
ethical rules (Anderson et al. 2006; Winfield et al. 2014), 
but these are rules that lack universality. They apply only 
in very limited and highly specific contexts. For example, 
Anderson et al. 2006) programmed a robot to use a set of 
ethical rules to decide whether or not to remind a patient 
to take their medicine, and whether or not to report the 
patient for not taking their medicine. As argued by Shar-
key (2017), there is as yet little indication that it will be 
possible to code a set of ethical rules that will work in all 
circumstances and in many contexts.
We suggest that a better approach would be to put the 
onus of proof on robot manufacturers and sellers. Just as 
in the pharmaceutical industry, they could be required to 
provide evidence that a given robot application would not 
cause psychological harm or derogate any human rights. 
Thus, certain sensitive applications such as the use of 
robots in care situations could have a default of prohibi-
tion unless convincing evidence was provided that demon-
strated benefits to wellbeing. Sensitive applications would 
include those involving babies, young children, and vul-
nerable older people. Some form of quality mark could be 
established to indicate that the robot had passed a set of 
ethical checks. The Foundation for Responsible Robotics 
has recently carried out a pilot project on the develop-
ment of an assessment framework for a quality mark for AI 
based robotics products (FRR pilot report, under embargo) 
The planned quality mark would assess robot products for 
the extent to which they adhered to a set of 8 principles 
for robots; namely (1) security, (2) safety, (3) privacy, (4) 
fairness, (5) sustainability, (6) accountability and (7) trans-
parency and (8) well-being. The approach is promising and 
could be adapted to include consideration of the risks of 
deception in social robots as explored here.
There are other measures that could be put in place to 
limit the exploitation of users. One example is that legisla-
tion could be passed to prevent robots that masquerade as 
friends or companions from using users’ data to manipu-
late them, for example, in purchasing advertised items. 
Another possible measure would be to require that any 
sharing of information obtained by the robot is made trans-
parent and explicit. As elucidated by Zuboff (2019), there 
are powerful forces behind ‘surveillance capitalism’ that 
are likely to mount a strong resistance to such attempts, 
but that does not mean it cannot be done. Attention should 
also be paid to assessing and limiting promotional descrip-
tions of robots, that exaggerate their functionality and their 
benefits.
Clearly these suggestions are merely a first step towards 
developing a comprehensive framework for the avoidance 
of harmful deceptions. Developing such a framework will 
be challenging because people can be entertained by and 
enthusiastic about interactive robots, but it is crucial to 
provide some means of protection for the more vulnerable 
members of society who may not have a good understand-
ing of the robots’ limitations.
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Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we argue for the need to recognise that 
there is deception in social robotics. Reflecting on its 
prevalence, we argued that intention is not necessary for 
deceit to have occurred. We garnered support from stud-
ies of humans and other animals. For example, vulnerable 
humans have been shown to be deceived by objects such 
as dolls that were intended for children’s play. In the ani-
mal kingdom, predators can be deceived by camouflage, 
mimicry, death feigning, or distraction displays that are the 
result of evolution rather than deception. If the behaviour 
and appearance of a robot leads to people believing that a 
robot has cognitive abilities or that it cares for and loves 
them, then, we argue, they are being deceived whether or 
not anyone intended to deceive them.
We do not suggest that all deceptive illusions in robot-
ics are wrong. Social robots can be entertaining and fun 
to interact with. Instead we argue that deception is wrong 
when it creates negative impacts on individuals and soci-
ety. The potential harmful impact of deceptions that result 
in an overestimation of a robot’s functionality include their 
inappropriate use to replace human care, and a misplaced 
trust in their ability to make decisions for which they are 
not qualified.
Responsibility for wrongful deception can be attributable 
to the combined contributions of users, developers and mar-
keters of robot applications. Preventing harmful deception 
is difficult, but our suggestion is for an evidenced quality or 
kite mark indicating that tangible efforts have been made to 
foresee, recognise and avoid likely negative consequences 
and demonstrating any claimed benefits. It is important to 
find ways to ensure that deception in social robotics does 
not lead to robots replacing meaningful human care, or to 
misplaced trust in decisions made by machines.
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